Security platform

See the whole attack. Investigate it for you. In your own cloud.

Yeti normalizes connected sources to one open schema, watches them four different ways, and puts a frontier agent on top to investigate. Connected and retained evidence stays customer-controlled; outbound dependencies are explicit, policy-governed, and topology-specific.

One open schema·Rule-based + behavioral detection·Agentic investigation·Customer-controlled BYOC
Detection

Four ways in, so nothing gets a free pass.

Every source is normalized to one open schema first, so a detection written once works everywhere. Then four independent methods run against it, each catching exactly what the others cannot.

Known-dangerous, the instant it happens
immediate

Root credentials used, audit logging turned off, a storage bucket made public, an admin policy attached out of nowhere. The actions that are never routine surface the moment they land, with no tuning window.

Patterns no single event reveals
across events

A burst of failed sign-ins that finally succeeds. Access that walks from one system to the next. Sequences are evaluated in event-time order and retain links to the evidence used for replay and review.

Behavior that breaks from normal
learned

The platform learns each user and host, then flags what does not fit them: a first-ever sign-in location, a jump between two places too far apart to be real, a volume spike measured against its own history, not a global guess.

One incident, not a pager storm
prioritized

Risk builds per user, host, and address as signals stack. Related findings can be grouped into an incident with visible evidence coverage and confidence, so analysts can review why it was prioritized.

Coverage

The whole security surface, into one correlated view.

Purpose-built OCSF parsers across cloud, identity, endpoint, network, and email feed the same pipeline, tagged to MITRE ATT&CK so coverage gaps are visible, not guessed.

Cloud

CloudTrail, VPC Flow, Route 53, GuardDuty, WAF, Azure AD, Azure VNet Flow, GCP Cloud Audit

Identity

Okta, OneLogin, Duo, CyberArk

Endpoint

CrowdStrike, Defender, SentinelOne, Sysmon, Windows, macOS, Linux, auditd, sshd

Network

Palo Alto, Fortinet, Cisco ASA, Cisco AAA, Juniper, Zeek, web proxy, honeypot

Email & more

Proofpoint, Veeam, JVM, and a documented path to add any source

39
parsers, growing
each maps a vendor format into the OCSF schema, with a fixture-tested path to add more
How it gets in
Syslog UDP / TCPAWS SQS (CloudTrail)Azure Event HubsGCP Pub/SubHTTP intakeSplunk HECSplunk-to-Splunk (S2S)NetFlow / sFlowPull connectors: Okta, Duo, Proofpoint, Azure Graph
Agentic investigation and response

The first hour of the work, already done.

The agent is scoped to your tenant by the auth layer, not by anything it can widen. It reads within that scope. A state-changing action runs only when effective policy and authority allow it; configured human approval remains a separate, enforceable gate.

Investigate end to end

The agent queries logs, traces, and metrics itself, correlates across sources, and returns root cause with the evidence attached.

Ask in plain language

Natural language is translated into the query the engine runs, so an analyst does not need to know the query dialect to hunt.

Suggest and tune rules

Draft a detection from a described behavior, check rule health, and map coverage against ATT&CK techniques.

Build a view from a prompt

Describe the dashboard you want and the agent plans and dry-runs it before anything is created.

Block an IP

A containment action with a who, what, and when written to a durable audit trail.

File a ticket

Push to Linear, Jira, or ServiceNow from the incident, with the context pre-filled.

Set a standing alert

Turn an investigation into a query-backed alert that watches for the pattern going forward.

No rip and replace

Forward into the SIEM you already run.

Put Yeti in front as the lossless capture and normalization tier. Normalized events can be shaped into the native schema of your existing platform, so nothing is a forklift migration and nothing you rely on today goes dark.

Microsoft Sentinel

Events land in native ASIM tables, queryable and alertable from the first event, not as a generic custom-log blob.

Google SecOps

The same events reshaped into UDM and routed to the right event type for Chronicle.

Any existing SIEM

Syslog forward to whatever you already run. A convenience copy; the lossless evidence tier stays the source of truth.

Alert channels
SlackPagerDutyWebhook / SOAREmail

Incidents are throttled and de-duplicated before they page anyone, using the official Slack and PagerDuty payload formats and a generic webhook for SOAR.

Threat intelligence

STIX / TAXII / MISP feed sync and AbuseIPDB enrichment. Indicators are matched against the live stream as events arrive.

Retrohunt: take a new indicator and sweep it across connected, accepted telemetry retained for the configured window, with source-health and coverage limits kept visible.

Go deeper

Two questions every regulated buyer asks first.

Vendor assurance — verify current evidence in the trust center
CertificatesverifyAudit reportsverifyScope statementsverifySBOMsverify

No certification or compliance status is inferred from this product page. Verify current issuer, identifier, scope, validity, reports, and contractual applicability in the trust center.

Certificate, SBOMs, and audit reportsTrust center →
Compliance without compromise

Auditors don’t accept “approximately”.

Filtering, deduplication, and AI summarization all share the same fatal flaw: when the investigator, the auditor, or the court asks for the original record, it’s already been deleted in the name of cost savings. Sasquatch preserves accepted telemetry in retained chunks and verifies each chunk by round-trip checksum.

Lossy stack output
Filter · dedupe · summarize
Audit fail
[2026-01-14 04:12:31] auth.login · user=alice
… 1,247 similar events suppressed …
[2026-01-14 04:58:02] auth.login · user=bob
… 89 events deduplicated …
[2026-01-14 05:14:19] payment.capture · status=ok
… 3,401 events merged into summary …

Auditor: “Where are the rest of the events? What was in them?” The answer is you don’t know — they were deleted upstream.

Sasquatch output
Lossless · verified
Audit pass
[2026-01-14 04:12:31.142] auth.login · user=alice · ip=10.1.2.34
[2026-01-14 04:12:31.203] auth.login · user=alice · ip=10.1.2.34 · retry
[2026-01-14 04:12:31.267] auth.login · user=alice · ip=10.1.2.34 · retry
… 4,734 more events, ordered, verified …
[2026-01-14 05:14:19.804] payment.capture · status=ok · amt=429.00
✓ 4,737 illustrative events · retained in SHA-256-verified chunks · record lineage preserved

Evidence result: the retained bytes match their integrity record. The deploying organization still owns control design, scope, operating evidence, and the auditor’s conclusion.

Frameworks you already answer to

These are the audits you face, and what lossless retention contributes to each — not certifications Sasquatch holds. For our own attestations, see trust.sasquatchlabs.io.

SOC 2
Audit evidence

Every security event captured, every privileged action traceable — across every microservice, every day.

HIPAA
PHI logging

Complete PHI access trails for your audit. No gaps, no summarization — the original records, not a sampled approximation.

PCI-DSS
CDE logging

Tamper-evident records across the cardholder data environment. Every authorization and admin action intact.

FedRAMP
Moderate · High

Connected, accepted telemetry remains available for the configured continuous-monitoring window.

Lossless verification

Every sealed retained chunk must pass the same round-trip rule.

SHA-256 of each retained chunk’s original bytes equals SHA-256 after decompression. Records retain lineage to verified chunks; a mismatch is rejected instead of being represented as verified evidence.

MUST
sealing requirement